{"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact","last":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026page=1\u0026view=compact"},"meta":{"pages":{"current_page":1,"next_page":null,"prev_page":null,"total_pages":1,"limit_value":10,"offset_value":0,"total_count":4,"first_page?":true,"last_page?":true}},"data":[{"id":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","type":"collection","attributes":{"title":"Montclair Intelligence Division Records","creator":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_repositories_2_resources_1301#creator","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":"Montclair Intelligence Division","label":"Creator"}},"abstract_or_scope":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_repositories_2_resources_1301#abstract_or_scope","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":"\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942.\u003c/p\u003e","label":"Abstract Or Scope"}},"breadcrumbs":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_repositories_2_resources_1301#breadcrumbs","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":{"id":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","ead_ssi":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","_root_":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","_nest_parent_":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","ead_source_url_ssi":"data/oai/WM/repositories_2_resources_1301.xml","title_filing_ssi":"Montclair Intelligence Division","title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"unitdate_ssm":["1940-1942","1940-1942"],"unitdate_bulk_ssim":["1940-1942"],"unitdate_inclusive_ssm":["1940-1942"],"level_ssm":["collection"],"level_ssim":["Collection"],"unitid_ssm":["Mss. Acc. 2007.116","/repositories/2/resources/1301"],"text":["Mss. Acc. 2007.116","/repositories/2/resources/1301","Montclair Intelligence Division Records","Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence","Collection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility.","The collection is arranged chronologically.","Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council."," Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings. "," For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.  Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause."," As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942.","The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity. ","The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.","Before reproducing or quoting from any materials, in whole or in part, permission must be obtained from the Special Collections Research Center, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library.","Special Collections Research Center","Montclair Intelligence Division","Randle, Thomas","English"],"unitid_tesim":["Mss. Acc. 2007.116","/repositories/2/resources/1301"],"normalized_title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"collection_title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"collection_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"repository_ssm":["College of William and Mary"],"repository_ssim":["College of William and Mary"],"creator_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division","Randle, Thomas"],"creator_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division","Randle, Thomas"],"creator_persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"creator_corpname_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division"],"creators_ssim":["Randle, Thomas","Montclair Intelligence Division"],"access_terms_ssm":["Before reproducing or quoting from any materials, in whole or in part, permission must be obtained from the Special Collections Research Center, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library."],"acqinfo_ssim":["Purchase."],"access_subjects_ssim":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"access_subjects_ssm":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"has_online_content_ssim":["false"],"extent_ssm":["0.20 Linear Feet"],"extent_tesim":["0.20 Linear Feet"],"genreform_ssim":["Correspondence"],"date_range_isim":[1940,1941,1942],"accessrestrict_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eCollection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility.\u003c/p\u003e"],"accessrestrict_heading_ssm":["Conditions Governing Access:"],"accessrestrict_tesim":["Collection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility."],"arrangement_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe collection is arranged chronologically.\u003c/p\u003e"],"arrangement_heading_ssm":["Arrangement of Materials:"],"arrangement_tesim":["The collection is arranged chronologically."],"bioghist_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eLocated west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council.\u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003e Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings. \u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003e For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.  Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.\u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003e As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"\u003c/p\u003e"],"bioghist_heading_ssm":["Historical Note:"],"bioghist_tesim":["Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council."," Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings. "," For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.  Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause."," As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\""],"prefercite_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eMontclair Intelligence Division Records, Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, College of William and Mary.\u003c/p\u003e"],"prefercite_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records, Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, College of William and Mary."],"scopecontent_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942.\u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity. \u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003eThe tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.\u003c/p\u003e"],"scopecontent_heading_ssm":["Scope and Contents"],"scopecontent_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942.","The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity. ","The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion."],"userestrict_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eBefore reproducing or quoting from any materials, in whole or in part, permission must be obtained from the Special Collections Research Center, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library.\u003c/p\u003e"],"userestrict_heading_ssm":["Conditions Governing Use:"],"userestrict_tesim":["Before reproducing or quoting from any materials, in whole or in part, permission must be obtained from the Special Collections Research Center, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library."],"names_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","Montclair Intelligence Division","Randle, Thomas"],"corpname_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","Montclair Intelligence Division"],"persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"language_ssim":["English"],"descrules_ssm":["Describing Archives: A Content Standard"],"total_component_count_is":5,"online_item_count_is":0,"component_level_isim":[0],"sort_isi":0,"timestamp":"2026-04-30T22:12:26.304Z","collection":{"numFound":1,"start":0,"numFoundExact":true,"docs":[{"id":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","ead_ssi":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","_root_":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","_nest_parent_":"viw_repositories_2_resources_1301","ead_source_url_ssi":"data/oai/WM/repositories_2_resources_1301.xml","title_filing_ssi":"Montclair Intelligence Division","title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"unitdate_ssm":["1940-1942","1940-1942"],"unitdate_bulk_ssim":["1940-1942"],"unitdate_inclusive_ssm":["1940-1942"],"level_ssm":["collection"],"level_ssim":["Collection"],"unitid_ssm":["Mss. Acc. 2007.116","/repositories/2/resources/1301"],"text":["Mss. Acc. 2007.116","/repositories/2/resources/1301","Montclair Intelligence Division Records","Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence","Collection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility.","The collection is arranged chronologically.","Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council."," Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings. "," For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.  Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause."," As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942.","The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity. ","The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.","Before reproducing or quoting from any materials, in whole or in part, permission must be obtained from the Special Collections Research Center, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library.","Special Collections Research Center","Montclair Intelligence Division","Randle, Thomas","English"],"unitid_tesim":["Mss. Acc. 2007.116","/repositories/2/resources/1301"],"normalized_title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"collection_title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"collection_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records"],"repository_ssm":["College of William and Mary"],"repository_ssim":["College of William and Mary"],"creator_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division","Randle, Thomas"],"creator_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division","Randle, Thomas"],"creator_persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"creator_corpname_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division"],"creators_ssim":["Randle, Thomas","Montclair Intelligence Division"],"access_terms_ssm":["Before reproducing or quoting from any materials, in whole or in part, permission must be obtained from the Special Collections Research Center, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library."],"acqinfo_ssim":["Purchase."],"access_subjects_ssim":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"access_subjects_ssm":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"has_online_content_ssim":["false"],"extent_ssm":["0.20 Linear Feet"],"extent_tesim":["0.20 Linear Feet"],"genreform_ssim":["Correspondence"],"date_range_isim":[1940,1941,1942],"accessrestrict_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eCollection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility.\u003c/p\u003e"],"accessrestrict_heading_ssm":["Conditions Governing Access:"],"accessrestrict_tesim":["Collection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility."],"arrangement_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe collection is arranged chronologically.\u003c/p\u003e"],"arrangement_heading_ssm":["Arrangement of Materials:"],"arrangement_tesim":["The collection is arranged chronologically."],"bioghist_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eLocated west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council.\u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003e Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings. \u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003e For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.  Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.\u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003e As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"\u003c/p\u003e"],"bioghist_heading_ssm":["Historical Note:"],"bioghist_tesim":["Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council."," Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings. "," For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.  Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause."," As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\""],"prefercite_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eMontclair Intelligence Division Records, Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, College of William and Mary.\u003c/p\u003e"],"prefercite_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records, Special Collections Research Center, Swem Library, College of William and Mary."],"scopecontent_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942.\u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity. \u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003eThe tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.\u003c/p\u003e"],"scopecontent_heading_ssm":["Scope and Contents"],"scopecontent_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942.","The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity. ","The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion."],"userestrict_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eBefore reproducing or quoting from any materials, in whole or in part, permission must be obtained from the Special Collections Research Center, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library.\u003c/p\u003e"],"userestrict_heading_ssm":["Conditions Governing Use:"],"userestrict_tesim":["Before reproducing or quoting from any materials, in whole or in part, permission must be obtained from the Special Collections Research Center, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library."],"names_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","Montclair Intelligence Division","Randle, Thomas"],"corpname_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","Montclair Intelligence Division"],"persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"language_ssim":["English"],"descrules_ssm":["Describing Archives: A Content Standard"],"total_component_count_is":5,"online_item_count_is":0,"component_level_isim":[0],"sort_isi":0,"timestamp":"2026-04-30T22:12:26.304Z"}]}},"label":"Breadcrumbs"}}},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_repositories_2_resources_1301"}},{"id":"viw_viw00205","type":"collection","attributes":{"title":"Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942","creator":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_viw00205#creator","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":"Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t","label":"Creator"}},"abstract_or_scope":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_viw00205#abstract_or_scope","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":"The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. ","label":"Abstract Or Scope"}},"breadcrumbs":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_viw00205#breadcrumbs","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":{"id":"viw_viw00205","ead_ssi":"viw_viw00205","_root_":"viw_viw00205","_nest_parent_":"viw_viw00205","ead_source_url_ssi":"data/wm/viw00205.xml","title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"level_ssm":["collection"],"level_ssim":["Collection"],"unitid_ssm":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116"],"text":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116","Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942","Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence","The collection is arranged chronologically.","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   \n","For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  \n","As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"\n","The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.\n","Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.\n","Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.\n","A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.\n","The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. \n","There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. \n","The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.\n","The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.\n","Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.  \n"," Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the  Special Collections Research Center Wiki","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  \n","The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","Special Collections Research Center","Randle, Thomas","\n\t  The papers are in:\n English"],"unitid_tesim":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116"],"normalized_title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"collection_title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"collection_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"repository_ssm":["College of William and Mary"],"repository_ssim":["College of William and Mary"],"creator_ssm":["Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t"],"creator_ssim":["Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t"],"creator_persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"creators_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"acqinfo_ssim":["The materials were acquired by Special Collections Research Center on 12/27/2007."],"access_subjects_ssim":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"access_subjects_ssm":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"has_online_content_ssim":["false"],"extent_ssm":["0.25"],"extent_tesim":["0.25"],"arrangement_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe collection is arranged chronologically.\u003c/p\u003e"],"arrangement_heading_ssm":["Arrangement of Materials"],"arrangement_tesim":["The collection is arranged chronologically."],"bioghist_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eLocated west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eFor purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eAs of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eSubsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003ePre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eA case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThere was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eBeginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.  \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003e Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the \u003cextref type=\"simple\" href=\"\"\u003eSpecial Collections Research Center Wiki\u003c/extref\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"],"bioghist_heading_ssm":["Biographical Note"],"bioghist_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   \n","For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  \n","As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"\n","The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.\n","Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.\n","Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.\n","A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.\n","The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. \n","There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. \n","The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.\n","The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.\n","Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.  \n"," Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the  Special Collections Research Center Wiki"],"scopecontent_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.\u003c/p\u003e"],"scopecontent_heading_ssm":["Scope and Contents"],"scopecontent_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  \n","The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion."],"abstract_html_tesm":["\u003cabstract encodinganalog=\"520$a\" label=\"Abstract:\"\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n\u003c/abstract\u003e"],"abstract_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n"],"names_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","Randle, Thomas"],"corpname_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center"],"persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"language_ssim":["\n\t  The papers are in:\n English"],"total_component_count_is":0,"online_item_count_is":0,"component_level_isim":[0],"sort_isi":0,"timestamp":"2026-04-30T21:18:21.515Z","collection":{"numFound":1,"start":0,"numFoundExact":true,"docs":[{"id":"viw_viw00205","ead_ssi":"viw_viw00205","_root_":"viw_viw00205","_nest_parent_":"viw_viw00205","ead_source_url_ssi":"data/wm/viw00205.xml","title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"level_ssm":["collection"],"level_ssim":["Collection"],"unitid_ssm":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116"],"text":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116","Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942","Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence","The collection is arranged chronologically.","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   \n","For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  \n","As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"\n","The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.\n","Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.\n","Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.\n","A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.\n","The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. \n","There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. \n","The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.\n","The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.\n","Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.  \n"," Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the  Special Collections Research Center Wiki","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  \n","The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","Special Collections Research Center","Randle, Thomas","\n\t  The papers are in:\n English"],"unitid_tesim":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116"],"normalized_title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"collection_title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"collection_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"repository_ssm":["College of William and Mary"],"repository_ssim":["College of William and Mary"],"creator_ssm":["Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t"],"creator_ssim":["Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t"],"creator_persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"creators_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"acqinfo_ssim":["The materials were acquired by Special Collections Research Center on 12/27/2007."],"access_subjects_ssim":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"access_subjects_ssm":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"has_online_content_ssim":["false"],"extent_ssm":["0.25"],"extent_tesim":["0.25"],"arrangement_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe collection is arranged chronologically.\u003c/p\u003e"],"arrangement_heading_ssm":["Arrangement of Materials"],"arrangement_tesim":["The collection is arranged chronologically."],"bioghist_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eLocated west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eFor purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eAs of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eSubsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003ePre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eA case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThere was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.\n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eBeginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.  \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003e Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the \u003cextref type=\"simple\" href=\"\"\u003eSpecial Collections Research Center Wiki\u003c/extref\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"],"bioghist_heading_ssm":["Biographical Note"],"bioghist_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   \n","For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  \n","As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"\n","The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.\n","Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.\n","Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.\n","A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.\n","The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. \n","There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. \n","The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.\n","The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.\n","Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.  \n"," Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the  Special Collections Research Center Wiki"],"scopecontent_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  \n\u003c/p\u003e","\u003cp\u003eThe tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.\u003c/p\u003e"],"scopecontent_heading_ssm":["Scope and Contents"],"scopecontent_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n","The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  \n","The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion."],"abstract_html_tesm":["\u003cabstract encodinganalog=\"520$a\" label=\"Abstract:\"\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n\u003c/abstract\u003e"],"abstract_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. \n"],"names_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","Randle, Thomas"],"corpname_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center"],"persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"language_ssim":["\n\t  The papers are in:\n English"],"total_component_count_is":0,"online_item_count_is":0,"component_level_isim":[0],"sort_isi":0,"timestamp":"2026-04-30T21:18:21.515Z"}]}},"label":"Breadcrumbs"}}},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_viw00205"}},{"id":"viw_viw00266","type":"collection","attributes":{"title":"Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942","creator":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_viw00266#creator","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":"Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t","label":"Creator"}},"abstract_or_scope":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_viw00266#abstract_or_scope","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":"\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity. The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II. In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\" He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.\u003c/p\u003e","label":"Abstract Or Scope"}},"breadcrumbs":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_viw00266#breadcrumbs","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":{"id":"viw_viw00266","ead_ssi":"viw_viw00266","_root_":"viw_viw00266","_nest_parent_":"viw_viw00266","ead_source_url_ssi":"data/wm/viw00266.xml","title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"level_ssm":["collection"],"level_ssim":["Collection"],"unitid_ssm":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116"],"text":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116","Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942","Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century.","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence","The collection is arranged chronologically.","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.   Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the Special Collections Research Center Wiki: \u003ca href=\"http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\"\u003ehttp://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\u003c/a\u003e.","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.","Special Collections Research Center","Randle, Thomas","\n\t  The papers are in:\n English"],"unitid_tesim":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116"],"normalized_title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"collection_title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"collection_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"repository_ssm":["College of William and Mary"],"repository_ssim":["College of William and Mary"],"creator_ssm":["Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t"],"creator_ssim":["Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t"],"creator_persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"creators_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"acqinfo_ssim":["The materials were acquired by Special Collections Research Center on 10/05/2007."],"access_subjects_ssim":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century.","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"access_subjects_ssm":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century.","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"has_online_content_ssim":["false"],"extent_ssm":["0.25"],"extent_tesim":["0.25"],"arrangement_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe collection is arranged chronologically.\u003c/p\u003e"],"arrangement_heading_ssm":["Arrangement of Materials"],"arrangement_tesim":["The collection is arranged chronologically."],"bioghist_heading_ssm":["Biographical Note"],"bioghist_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.   Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the Special Collections Research Center Wiki: \u003ca href=\"http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\"\u003ehttp://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\u003c/a\u003e."],"scopecontent_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.\u003c/p\u003e"],"scopecontent_heading_ssm":["Scope and Contents"],"scopecontent_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion."],"names_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","Randle, Thomas"],"corpname_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center"],"persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"language_ssim":["\n\t  The papers are in:\n English"],"total_component_count_is":0,"online_item_count_is":0,"component_level_isim":[0],"sort_isi":0,"timestamp":"2026-04-30T21:22:12.643Z","bioghist_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.   Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the Special Collections Research Center Wiki: \u0026lt;a href=\"http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\"\u0026gt;http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\u0026lt;/a\u0026gt;.\u003c/p\u003e"],"collection":{"numFound":1,"start":0,"numFoundExact":true,"docs":[{"id":"viw_viw00266","ead_ssi":"viw_viw00266","_root_":"viw_viw00266","_nest_parent_":"viw_viw00266","ead_source_url_ssi":"data/wm/viw00266.xml","title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"level_ssm":["collection"],"level_ssim":["Collection"],"unitid_ssm":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116"],"text":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116","Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942","Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century.","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence","The collection is arranged chronologically.","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.   Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the Special Collections Research Center Wiki: \u003ca href=\"http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\"\u003ehttp://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\u003c/a\u003e.","The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.","Special Collections Research Center","Randle, Thomas","\n\t  The papers are in:\n English"],"unitid_tesim":["01/Mss.  Acc. 2007.116"],"normalized_title_ssm":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"collection_title_tesim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"collection_ssim":["Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942"],"repository_ssm":["College of William and Mary"],"repository_ssim":["College of William and Mary"],"creator_ssm":["Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t"],"creator_ssim":["Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t"],"creator_persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"creators_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"acqinfo_ssim":["The materials were acquired by Special Collections Research Center on 10/05/2007."],"access_subjects_ssim":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century.","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"access_subjects_ssm":["Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century.","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","Correspondence"],"has_online_content_ssim":["false"],"extent_ssm":["0.25"],"extent_tesim":["0.25"],"arrangement_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe collection is arranged chronologically.\u003c/p\u003e"],"arrangement_heading_ssm":["Arrangement of Materials"],"arrangement_tesim":["The collection is arranged chronologically."],"bioghist_heading_ssm":["Biographical Note"],"bioghist_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.   Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the Special Collections Research Center Wiki: \u003ca href=\"http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\"\u003ehttp://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\u003c/a\u003e."],"scopecontent_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion.\u003c/p\u003e"],"scopecontent_heading_ssm":["Scope and Contents"],"scopecontent_tesim":["The letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. The letters in the collection of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council are dated September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. They contain information pertaining to the organization of the division, prospective recruits and reports on potential subversive activity.  The tone of the letters change somewhat with America's entrance into World War II.  In a letter, dated December 8, 1941, Randle asks his recruits to take stronger steps to stop subversive activities, indicating Montclair to be in a part of the country \"riddled with foreign agents.\"  He asks them to report any un-American activity to the division and to do so without arousing suspicion."],"names_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","Randle, Thomas"],"corpname_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center"],"persname_ssim":["Randle, Thomas"],"language_ssim":["\n\t  The papers are in:\n English"],"total_component_count_is":0,"online_item_count_is":0,"component_level_isim":[0],"sort_isi":0,"timestamp":"2026-04-30T21:22:12.643Z","bioghist_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eThe letters in the collection consist of correspondence between Thomas Randle, the head of the Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council, and various members of the organization dated from September 9, 1940 to August 9, 1942. Located west of New York City, Montclair, New Jersey had a population of approximately 40,000 in the late 1930s.  At the time, a group of  the citizens of  the New York  suburb,  troubled over potential fifth column activity in their community, formed an intelligence gathering organization to expose perceived subversive activities. The organization eventually became part of the official civil defense apparatus of the town and was referred to as the  Intelligence Division of the Montclair Security Council. Colonel Dallas Townsend, a New York attorney and Montclair resident, served as the town's Commissioner of Public Safety and the members of the Intelligence Division reported to him. Official recognition was granted to the group by Townsend in the Fall of 1941, giving it work space in the Montclair Municipal Building, where it held regular monthly meetings.   For purposes of their activities, the Intelligence Division partitioned Montclair into fifteen sections, each headed by a \"key man.\"  Ten to fifteen \"thoroughly trustworthy\", \"good substantial Americans\" of unquestioned patriotism were assigned to, or recruited by, each of the key men.  They were from  \"different levels of society and various social groups.\"  In this pyramidal structure, key men did not know the identity of other key men and the lower level informants only knew their own key man.   Members of the Intelligence Division were to report to the next most superior authority on activities they \"construed as subversive or un-American in any way.\"  Correspondence from operatives was addressed to their key man in care of the office at municipal building.  Townsend, the top of the intelligence gathering pyramid, would then turn over information to the FBI if he thought it represented information sympathetic to the Nazi cause.  As of July, 1941, according to the Montclair Times, the intelligence division had been operating for over a year. The newspaper claimed it was remarkably successful in uncovering potential subversive activities and fascist sentiment. Although the FBI never reported back to the intelligence division as to the outcome of information passed to it, the newspaper credited the intelligence division with 43 reports to the FBI resulting \"in several arrest and convictions.\"The term \"fifth column\" is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio de Mola who first used the phrase during the Spanish Civil War.  Mola saw Nationalist sympathizers advancing towards Madrid from four directions and a fifth force ready to arise for the cause.  The forces of this fifth column, having been previously involved in espionage, sabotage and subversion within Madrid, would leave Spain divided, demoralized and unprepared for war.  They would then join the advancing armies in the fight against the Second Spanish Republic.Subsequently, the term fifth column was more closely applied to, and has been identified with, the activities of the Nazis prior to and during World War II although Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union used the technique also. An analogy is made between subversives forming a fifth column to the Greek soldiers at the siege of Troy who infiltrated the city from the belly of a great wooden horse, the Trojan Horse.Pre-war England and Europe were obsessed with spy hysteria. Given the closeness of the Nazi threat, it was reasonable to assume the presence of a covert domestic destructive force.   Because of the large number of Fascist sympathizers in Latin America, concerns over the presence of a fifth column and the potential impact could also be understood.A case for the fears and panic that arose in the United States concerning a Trojan Horse in America can also made.  The notion that  Hitler would use fifth column tactics in United States was fostered by German activities in the United States prior to World War I.  In 1917,  German spies and saboteurs engaged in disruptions at defense plants in the United States.  Incendiary devices were found aboard merchant ships and assumed to be planted by German agents or sympathizers. With the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, the activities of the German American Bund and various other fascist groups in America began to arouse suspicion over loyalties.  In the 1930s,  government inquiries, conducted largely by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, broke several German spy rings, exposed clumsy Nazi propaganda efforts and thwarted several sabotage missions.  In 1938, the FBI uncovered a German spy ring operating in New York City proving Hitler operatives were active. The breaking of the Duquesne spy ring received national coverage and increased public awareness of the presence of German operatives and resulted, after a lengthy investigation, in the conviction on espionage charges of 33 Nazi agents.The panic escalated throughout 1939 and 1940 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France fell to the Nazis.  In 1940, a Gallup Poll indicated that 48% of Americans were convinced that their communities had been infiltrated elements of a \"fifth column\"  and another 26% could not be sure.  The intensification of the panic can be measured by the number of complaints relating to potential  fifth column activity submitted to the FBI.  In the period between 1933 and 1938, the FBI received, on average, 35 potential cases per year.  The number grew to 250 cases  in 1938, 1,615 in the year 1939 and on one day in May, 1940 the FBI received 2,871 reports of suspected cases of espionage submitted mainly by sincere citizens troubled by events they perceived to be evidence of subversion. Newspaper articles, magazine features, personal memoirs, novels, comic books, radio programs  promoted the idea of a covert subversive force.  The media gave extensive coverage to stories of German espionage, sabotage, and subversion in legitimate stories of actual cases of \"fifth column\" activity uncovered by American intelligence.  Released in 1939, the popular Warner Brothers motion picture, \"Confessions of a Nazi Spy\"  is a prime example the movie industry encouraging fear among the public. There was a gap, however, between the perception of a Trojan Horse activity in the United States and the reality of its magnitude and effectiveness.  In hindsight, and partially through the admission of Hitler himself, fifth column activity in the United States was of a low priority to the Nazis.  The espionage, sabotage and subversion in the America was modest and almost uniformly unsuccessful.  But  officials of the United States government did not discourage the media from promoting the belief of the  high level of the threat of German subversion and did little to calm public fears. In fact, the government encouraged the mania. The White House, Congress and the FBI all proclaimed it as an ominous threat to national security,  and had reason to overstate its scope. Those in the Roosevelt administration, and Roosevelt himself, favoring intervention in Europe used it as an argument against the policy of isolation pointing out that the threat was already present and using subversive tactics in America.  The Congress, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies, used the threat of a Nazi \"fifth column\" to bolster its investigations into a Soviet \"fifth column\" and to criticize the isolationalists in the administration.  The FBI promoted the idea that agents of the fifth column had penetrated every aspect of American life.  J. Edgar Hoover spoke of the threat in alarming terms. At the time the FBI was a small organization given the enormously difficult task of domestic counterespionage.  Hoover depended on public vigilance and cooperation and he made sure the nation took the threat seriously.  He was able to receive the funding and manpower to fight the fifth column by overemphasizing the severity of the problem.The panic reached a new level after December 7, 1941 with America's formal entry into the war against the Axis powers.Beginning in the Fall of 1942, the fear declined sharply as Allies forces moved on the offensive.  No major wartime spy ring emerged and governmental warnings of a threat subsided although anecdotal stories of a Nazi \"fifth column\" persisted.   Further information about this individual or organization may be available in the Special Collections Research Center Wiki: \u0026lt;a href=\"http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\"\u0026gt;http://scrc.swem.wm.edu/wiki/index.php/Thomas Randle\u0026lt;/a\u0026gt;.\u003c/p\u003e"]}]}},"label":"Breadcrumbs"}}},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_viw00266"}},{"id":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","type":"collection","attributes":{"title":"Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program","creator":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_repositories_2_resources_8315#creator","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":"Calandra, Salvatore Rocco","label":"Creator"}},"abstract_or_scope":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_repositories_2_resources_8315#abstract_or_scope","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":"\u003cp\u003e30 page photograph album created on black construction paper. Cover is present, but back of the photograph album is missing. Contains mostly photographs, with captions, of Calandra and fellow army service members as they train and prepare for an Italian Service Unit in the United States. \u003c/p\u003e","label":"Abstract Or Scope"}},"breadcrumbs":{"id":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_repositories_2_resources_8315#breadcrumbs","type":"document_value","attributes":{"value":{"id":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","ead_ssi":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","_root_":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","_nest_parent_":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","ead_source_url_ssi":"data/oai/WM/repositories_2_resources_8315.xml","title_filing_ssi":"Calandra, Salvatore Rocco Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program","title_ssm":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"title_tesim":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"unitdate_ssm":["1944-1945"],"unitdate_inclusive_ssm":["1944-1945"],"level_ssm":["collection"],"level_ssim":["Collection"],"unitid_ssm":["SC 01583","/repositories/2/resources/8315"],"text":["SC 01583","/repositories/2/resources/8315","Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program","World War, 1939-1945","World War, 1939-1945 -- Prisoners and prisons, Italian","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","World War, 1939-1945 -- Italian Americans","Collection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility.","30 page photograph album created on black construction paper. Cover is present, but back of the photograph album is missing. Contains mostly photographs, with captions, of Calandra and fellow army service members as they train and prepare for an Italian Service Unit in the United States. ","Rocco served at duty stations all across the United States and provides a detailed map and dates of each of the 17 bases he visited. Rocco was part of the United State's effort to utilize former Italian POW's who were held in the states once Italy's war against the United States ended and they declared war upon the Germans.  ","The Italian Service Unit performed essential duties on behalf of the United States Army, and wore US Army uniforms for the duration of their service. Two patches which distinguished the Italian Service Unit are also included in this photograph album.   ","Before publishing quotations or excerpts from any materials, permission must be obtained from the Curator of Manuscripts and Rare Books, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library.","Special Collections Research Center","United States. Army","Calandra, Salvatore Rocco","English"],"unitid_tesim":["SC 01583","/repositories/2/resources/8315"],"normalized_title_ssm":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"collection_title_tesim":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"collection_ssim":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"repository_ssm":["College of William and Mary"],"repository_ssim":["College of William and Mary"],"creator_ssm":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"creator_ssim":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"creator_persname_ssim":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"creators_ssim":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"access_terms_ssm":["Before publishing quotations or excerpts from any materials, permission must be obtained from the Curator of Manuscripts and Rare Books, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library."],"acqinfo_ssim":["Purchased from Langdon Manor Books with funds from the Lyon Gardiner Tyler Library Endowment, 2018."],"access_subjects_ssim":["World War, 1939-1945","World War, 1939-1945 -- Prisoners and prisons, Italian","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","World War, 1939-1945 -- Italian Americans"],"access_subjects_ssm":["World War, 1939-1945","World War, 1939-1945 -- Prisoners and prisons, Italian","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","World War, 1939-1945 -- Italian Americans"],"has_online_content_ssim":["false"],"extent_ssm":["0.16 Linear Feet"],"extent_tesim":["0.16 Linear Feet"],"date_range_isim":[1944,1945],"accessrestrict_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eCollection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility.\u003c/p\u003e"],"accessrestrict_heading_ssm":["Conditions Governing Access"],"accessrestrict_tesim":["Collection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility."],"prefercite_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eSalvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program, 1944-1945, Special Collections Research Center, William \u0026amp; Mary Libraries.\u003c/p\u003e"],"prefercite_tesim":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program, 1944-1945, Special Collections Research Center, William \u0026 Mary Libraries."],"scopecontent_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003e30 page photograph album created on black construction paper. Cover is present, but back of the photograph album is missing. Contains mostly photographs, with captions, of Calandra and fellow army service members as they train and prepare for an Italian Service Unit in the United States. \u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003eRocco served at duty stations all across the United States and provides a detailed map and dates of each of the 17 bases he visited. Rocco was part of the United State's effort to utilize former Italian POW's who were held in the states once Italy's war against the United States ended and they declared war upon the Germans.  \u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003eThe Italian Service Unit performed essential duties on behalf of the United States Army, and wore US Army uniforms for the duration of their service. Two patches which distinguished the Italian Service Unit are also included in this photograph album.   \u003c/p\u003e"],"scopecontent_heading_ssm":["Scope and Contents"],"scopecontent_tesim":["30 page photograph album created on black construction paper. Cover is present, but back of the photograph album is missing. Contains mostly photographs, with captions, of Calandra and fellow army service members as they train and prepare for an Italian Service Unit in the United States. ","Rocco served at duty stations all across the United States and provides a detailed map and dates of each of the 17 bases he visited. Rocco was part of the United State's effort to utilize former Italian POW's who were held in the states once Italy's war against the United States ended and they declared war upon the Germans.  ","The Italian Service Unit performed essential duties on behalf of the United States Army, and wore US Army uniforms for the duration of their service. Two patches which distinguished the Italian Service Unit are also included in this photograph album.   "],"userestrict_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eBefore publishing quotations or excerpts from any materials, permission must be obtained from the Curator of Manuscripts and Rare Books, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library.\u003c/p\u003e"],"userestrict_heading_ssm":["Conditions Governing Use"],"userestrict_tesim":["Before publishing quotations or excerpts from any materials, permission must be obtained from the Curator of Manuscripts and Rare Books, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library."],"names_coll_ssim":["United States. Army"],"names_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","United States. Army","Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"corpname_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","United States. Army"],"persname_ssim":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"language_ssim":["English"],"descrules_ssm":["Describing Archives: A Content Standard"],"total_component_count_is":1,"online_item_count_is":0,"component_level_isim":[0],"sort_isi":0,"timestamp":"2026-04-30T22:07:20.612Z","collection":{"numFound":1,"start":0,"numFoundExact":true,"docs":[{"id":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","ead_ssi":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","_root_":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","_nest_parent_":"viw_repositories_2_resources_8315","ead_source_url_ssi":"data/oai/WM/repositories_2_resources_8315.xml","title_filing_ssi":"Calandra, Salvatore Rocco Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program","title_ssm":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"title_tesim":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"unitdate_ssm":["1944-1945"],"unitdate_inclusive_ssm":["1944-1945"],"level_ssm":["collection"],"level_ssim":["Collection"],"unitid_ssm":["SC 01583","/repositories/2/resources/8315"],"text":["SC 01583","/repositories/2/resources/8315","Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program","World War, 1939-1945","World War, 1939-1945 -- Prisoners and prisons, Italian","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","World War, 1939-1945 -- Italian Americans","Collection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility.","30 page photograph album created on black construction paper. Cover is present, but back of the photograph album is missing. Contains mostly photographs, with captions, of Calandra and fellow army service members as they train and prepare for an Italian Service Unit in the United States. ","Rocco served at duty stations all across the United States and provides a detailed map and dates of each of the 17 bases he visited. Rocco was part of the United State's effort to utilize former Italian POW's who were held in the states once Italy's war against the United States ended and they declared war upon the Germans.  ","The Italian Service Unit performed essential duties on behalf of the United States Army, and wore US Army uniforms for the duration of their service. Two patches which distinguished the Italian Service Unit are also included in this photograph album.   ","Before publishing quotations or excerpts from any materials, permission must be obtained from the Curator of Manuscripts and Rare Books, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library.","Special Collections Research Center","United States. Army","Calandra, Salvatore Rocco","English"],"unitid_tesim":["SC 01583","/repositories/2/resources/8315"],"normalized_title_ssm":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"collection_title_tesim":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"collection_ssim":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program"],"repository_ssm":["College of William and Mary"],"repository_ssim":["College of William and Mary"],"creator_ssm":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"creator_ssim":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"creator_persname_ssim":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"creators_ssim":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"access_terms_ssm":["Before publishing quotations or excerpts from any materials, permission must be obtained from the Curator of Manuscripts and Rare Books, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library."],"acqinfo_ssim":["Purchased from Langdon Manor Books with funds from the Lyon Gardiner Tyler Library Endowment, 2018."],"access_subjects_ssim":["World War, 1939-1945","World War, 1939-1945 -- Prisoners and prisons, Italian","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","World War, 1939-1945 -- Italian Americans"],"access_subjects_ssm":["World War, 1939-1945","World War, 1939-1945 -- Prisoners and prisons, Italian","World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","World War, 1939-1945 -- Italian Americans"],"has_online_content_ssim":["false"],"extent_ssm":["0.16 Linear Feet"],"extent_tesim":["0.16 Linear Feet"],"date_range_isim":[1944,1945],"accessrestrict_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eCollection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility.\u003c/p\u003e"],"accessrestrict_heading_ssm":["Conditions Governing Access"],"accessrestrict_tesim":["Collection is open to all researchers. Manuscript collections and archival records may contain materials with sensitive or confidential information that is protected under federal or state right to privacy laws and regulations, such as the Virginia Public Records Act (Code of Virginia. § 42.1-76-91); and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3705.5). Confidential material may include, but is not limited to, educational, medical, and personnel records. If sensitive material is found in this collection, please contact a staff member immediately. The disclosure of personally identifiable information pertaining to a living individual may have legal consequences for which the College of William and Mary assumes no responsibility."],"prefercite_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eSalvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program, 1944-1945, Special Collections Research Center, William \u0026amp; Mary Libraries.\u003c/p\u003e"],"prefercite_tesim":["Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program, 1944-1945, Special Collections Research Center, William \u0026 Mary Libraries."],"scopecontent_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003e30 page photograph album created on black construction paper. Cover is present, but back of the photograph album is missing. Contains mostly photographs, with captions, of Calandra and fellow army service members as they train and prepare for an Italian Service Unit in the United States. \u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003eRocco served at duty stations all across the United States and provides a detailed map and dates of each of the 17 bases he visited. Rocco was part of the United State's effort to utilize former Italian POW's who were held in the states once Italy's war against the United States ended and they declared war upon the Germans.  \u003c/p\u003e\n","\u003cp\u003eThe Italian Service Unit performed essential duties on behalf of the United States Army, and wore US Army uniforms for the duration of their service. Two patches which distinguished the Italian Service Unit are also included in this photograph album.   \u003c/p\u003e"],"scopecontent_heading_ssm":["Scope and Contents"],"scopecontent_tesim":["30 page photograph album created on black construction paper. Cover is present, but back of the photograph album is missing. Contains mostly photographs, with captions, of Calandra and fellow army service members as they train and prepare for an Italian Service Unit in the United States. ","Rocco served at duty stations all across the United States and provides a detailed map and dates of each of the 17 bases he visited. Rocco was part of the United State's effort to utilize former Italian POW's who were held in the states once Italy's war against the United States ended and they declared war upon the Germans.  ","The Italian Service Unit performed essential duties on behalf of the United States Army, and wore US Army uniforms for the duration of their service. Two patches which distinguished the Italian Service Unit are also included in this photograph album.   "],"userestrict_html_tesm":["\u003cp\u003eBefore publishing quotations or excerpts from any materials, permission must be obtained from the Curator of Manuscripts and Rare Books, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library.\u003c/p\u003e"],"userestrict_heading_ssm":["Conditions Governing Use"],"userestrict_tesim":["Before publishing quotations or excerpts from any materials, permission must be obtained from the Curator of Manuscripts and Rare Books, and the holder of the copyright, if not Swem Library."],"names_coll_ssim":["United States. Army"],"names_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","United States. Army","Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"corpname_ssim":["Special Collections Research Center","United States. Army"],"persname_ssim":["Calandra, Salvatore Rocco"],"language_ssim":["English"],"descrules_ssm":["Describing Archives: A Content Standard"],"total_component_count_is":1,"online_item_count_is":0,"component_level_isim":[0],"sort_isi":0,"timestamp":"2026-04-30T22:07:20.612Z"}]}},"label":"Breadcrumbs"}}},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/viw_repositories_2_resources_8315"}}],"included":[{"type":"facet","id":"repository_ssim","attributes":{"label":"Repository","items":[{"attributes":{"label":"College of William and Mary","value":"College of William and Mary","hits":4},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Brepository%5D%5B%5D=College+of+William+and+Mary\u0026view=compact"}}]},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/facet/repository_ssim.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"facet","id":"collection_ssim","attributes":{"label":"Collection","items":[{"attributes":{"label":"Montclair Intelligence Division Records","value":"Montclair Intelligence Division Records","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bcollection%5D%5B%5D=Montclair+Intelligence+Division+Records\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942","value":"Montclair Intelligence Division Records\t 1940-1942 1940-1942","hits":2},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bcollection%5D%5B%5D=Montclair+Intelligence+Division+Records%09+1940-1942+1940-1942\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program","value":"Salvatore Rocco Calandra Photograph Album of the Italian Service Unit Program","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bcollection%5D%5B%5D=Salvatore+Rocco+Calandra+Photograph+Album+of+the+Italian+Service+Unit+Program\u0026view=compact"}}]},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/facet/collection_ssim.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"facet","id":"date_range_isim","attributes":{"label":"Date range","items":[{"attributes":{"label":"1940","value":"1940","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bdate_range%5D%5B%5D=1940\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"1941","value":"1941","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bdate_range%5D%5B%5D=1941\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"1942","value":"1942","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bdate_range%5D%5B%5D=1942\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"1944","value":"1944","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bdate_range%5D%5B%5D=1944\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"1945","value":"1945","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bdate_range%5D%5B%5D=1945\u0026view=compact"}}]},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/facet/date_range_isim.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"facet","id":"creator_ssim","attributes":{"label":"Creator","items":[{"attributes":{"label":"Calandra, Salvatore Rocco","value":"Calandra, Salvatore Rocco","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bcreators%5D%5B%5D=Calandra%2C+Salvatore+Rocco\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Montclair Intelligence Division","value":"Montclair Intelligence Division","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bcreators%5D%5B%5D=Montclair+Intelligence+Division\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Randle, Thomas","value":"Randle, Thomas","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bcreators%5D%5B%5D=Randle%2C+Thomas\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t","value":"Randle, Thomas \narrangement\n\t","hits":2},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bcreators%5D%5B%5D=Randle%2C+Thomas+%0Aarrangement%0A%09\u0026view=compact"}}]},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/facet/creator_ssim.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"facet","id":"names_ssim","attributes":{"label":"Names","items":[{"attributes":{"label":"Calandra, Salvatore Rocco","value":"Calandra, Salvatore Rocco","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bnames%5D%5B%5D=Calandra%2C+Salvatore+Rocco\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Montclair Intelligence Division","value":"Montclair Intelligence Division","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bnames%5D%5B%5D=Montclair+Intelligence+Division\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Randle, Thomas","value":"Randle, Thomas","hits":3},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bnames%5D%5B%5D=Randle%2C+Thomas\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Special Collections Research Center","value":"Special Collections Research Center","hits":4},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bnames%5D%5B%5D=Special+Collections+Research+Center\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"United States. Army","value":"United States. Army","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Bnames%5D%5B%5D=United+States.+Army\u0026view=compact"}}]},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/facet/names_ssim.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"facet","id":"access_subjects_ssim","attributes":{"label":"Subjects","items":[{"attributes":{"label":"Correspondence","value":"Correspondence","hits":3},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=Correspondence\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","value":"Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century","hits":2},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=Subversive+activities--United+States--History--20th+century\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century.","value":"Subversive activities--United States--History--20th century.","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=Subversive+activities--United+States--History--20th+century.\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"World War, 1939-1945","value":"World War, 1939-1945","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"World War, 1939-1945 -- Italian Americans","value":"World War, 1939-1945 -- Italian Americans","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945+--+Italian+Americans\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"World War, 1939-1945 -- Prisoners and prisons, Italian","value":"World War, 1939-1945 -- Prisoners and prisons, Italian","hits":1},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945+--+Prisoners+and+prisons%2C+Italian\u0026view=compact"}},{"attributes":{"label":"World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","value":"World War, 1939-1945--Collaborationists","hits":4},"links":{"remove":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact"}}]},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/facet/access_subjects_ssim.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"facet","id":"level_ssim","attributes":{"label":"Level","items":[{"attributes":{"label":"Collection","value":"Collection","hits":4},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026f%5Blevel%5D%5B%5D=Collection\u0026view=compact"}}]},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog/facet/level_ssim.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"search_field","id":"all_fields","attributes":{"label":"All Fields"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026search_field=all_fields\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"search_field","id":"keyword","attributes":{"label":"Keyword"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026search_field=keyword\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"search_field","id":"name","attributes":{"label":"Name"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026search_field=name\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"search_field","id":"place","attributes":{"label":"Place"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026search_field=place\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"search_field","id":"subject","attributes":{"label":"Subject"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026search_field=subject\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"search_field","id":"title","attributes":{"label":"Title"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026search_field=title\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"search_field","id":"container","attributes":{"label":"Container"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026search_field=container\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"search_field","id":"identifier","attributes":{"label":"Identifier"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026search_field=identifier\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"sort","id":"score desc, title_sort asc","attributes":{"label":"relevance"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026sort=score+desc%2C+title_sort+asc\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"sort","id":"date_sort asc","attributes":{"label":"date (ascending)"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026sort=date_sort+asc\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"sort","id":"date_sort desc","attributes":{"label":"date (descending)"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026sort=date_sort+desc\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"sort","id":"creator_sort asc","attributes":{"label":"creator (A-Z)"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026sort=creator_sort+asc\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"sort","id":"creator_sort desc","attributes":{"label":"creator (Z-A)"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026sort=creator_sort+desc\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"sort","id":"title_sort asc","attributes":{"label":"title (A-Z)"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026sort=title_sort+asc\u0026view=compact"}},{"type":"sort","id":"title_sort desc","attributes":{"label":"title (Z-A)"},"links":{"self":"https://search.arvasarchive.org/catalog.json?f%5Baccess_subjects%5D%5B%5D=World+War%2C+1939-1945--Collaborationists\u0026sort=title_sort+desc\u0026view=compact"}}]}